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In their study of federal judicial appointments in Canada from 1984 to
1988, Peter Russell and Jacob Ziegel indicated that one of the purposes
of their study was to “establish the basis for a future comparison between
the judicial appointments made before the introduction of the ... judicial
advisory committees and the appointments made after them” ~1991: 8!.
Before the establishment of these screening committees, Russell and Zie-
gel found significant patronage existed in judicial appointments. Indeed,
despite the Mulroney government’s election pledge to reduce patronage,
nearly half of the federal judicial appointments made between 1984 and
1988 had some connection to the governing Progressive Conservative
party. Russell and Ziegel found, moreover, that the appointees for whom
they discovered partisan connections also tended to be rated as lower qual-
ity appointments than appointees with no known political affiliation. How-
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ever, Russell and Ziegel’s data end in 1988 and a full comparison has yet
to be made between the pre-committee appointments they studied and
those made after the screening committees were introduced.
This article undertakes the comparison envisioned by Russell and Zie-
gel by examining the political backgrounds of appointees from 1989 to
2003—a time period that encompasses Mulroney’s second term as prime
minister as well as ten years of Chrétien’s time as prime minister1—
while also, more generally, assessing the impact of the changes to federal
judicial appointments announced in 1988. Did the screening committees
reduce the relevance of political connections in the federal judicial appoint-
ments process or have patronage appointments continued unabated? Have
the screening committees affected the perceptions of the appointments pro-
cess generally, and the quality of individual federal judicial appointments?
These are important issues, given the increasingly influential role
that courts play in the governing process and the relatively high reliance
of courts, compared to other institutions, on public and elite support to
undergird their authority. At an individual level the appointment process
can be more or less fair to those applying to become a judge, and people
and organizations can be impacted profoundly by the types of judges put
on the bench, both in terms of how judges treat them and by how they
decide cases.
The next section of the article describes briefly the federal judicial
selection process and the findings of earlier studies. The article then out-
lines the research methods used for our current study before discussing
our results and their implications. We conclude that political connections
continued to play an important role in who was selected for a judicial
appointment after the introduction of the screening committees in 1988,
though the new process may have worked to prevent ~for the most part!
the politically motivated appointment of completely unqualified individ-
uals. Our findings also suggest that the relevance of patronage varied by
region and interacted with other “political” factors, such as group repre-
sentation on the bench. The article concludes with some thoughts about
potential changes to the appointment system with reference to how other
jurisdictions negotiate the complex interplay between judicial appoint-
ments and judicial independence and, more generally, the relationship
between the judiciary and other actors in the overall scheme of governance.
Background
Historical
The Constitution Act, 1867 provides that section 96 judges shall be
appointed by the Governor General though, in practice, this power is exer-
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cised by the minister of justice ~in consultation with the cabinet! and, in
the case of “chief justices,” by the prime minister. Section 101 of the
Constitution Act, 1867 gives the federal government the authority to estab-
lish a general court of appeal and other courts that it deems necessary.
The legislation that established the s.101 courts provides that judges shall
be appointed by order in council; in reality, as with the s. 96 courts, this
power is exercised by the minister of justice and the prime minister. His-
torically, patronage played a very significant role in federal judicial
appointments. The Canadian Bar Association, in an effort to improve the
appointment process, established the National Committee on the Judi-
ciary in 1967 to screen the names of judicial candidates forwarded by
the minister of justice. In the early 1970s, ministers of justice began to
use special advisors to accumulate information about prospective candi-
dates from judges, members of the law profession and provincial attor-
neys general.
The system, however, still allowed for patronage to play a consider-
able role in the appointment process. This was amply demonstrated by sev-
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eral patronage appointments made at the end of the Trudeau0Turner years,
which generated considerable criticism and brought the appointment pro-
cess under greater scrutiny, most notably by the Canadian Bar Association’s
McKelvey Committee. Based on interviews with federal and provincial
officials, judges and lawyers, the committee concluded that partisan con-
siderations played a predominant influence in s.96 appointments in the
Atlantic provinces and Saskatchewan, and were significant in Alberta and
Manitoba. Respondents in BC, Ontario and Quebec provided a more mixed
assessment of the role of patronage, which suggested that patronage was
not as significant a factor in appointments, though the importance of party
affiliation varied to some degree depending on the federal minister of jus-
tice ~Canadian Bar Association, 1985: 37–40!. As for the Federal Court,
patronage was found to have been a “dominant” consideration, with many
appointees having been “active supporters of the party in power” ~Cana-
dian Bar Association, 1985: 57!.
In 1991, Russell and Ziegel published their study of the Mulroney
government’s judicial appointments from 1984 to 1988, based on ques-
tionnaire responses from individuals in law, politics, academia and the
media who might have been familiar with the appointees. The results
indicated that 24.1 per cent of appointees had “major” involvement with
the Conservative party ~as a party official, as an active participant in an
election or leadership campaign or as a candidate for elected office! and
23.2 per cent had “minor” involvement with the Conservative party ~minor
constituency work, financial contributions or close personal or profes-
sional associations with party leaders!.2 Involvement with an opposition
party was ascribed to 7.1 per cent of appointees ~5.3 per cent “major”
and 1.8 per cent “minor”!. The data show that in the late 1980s, patron-
age remained an important factor in the appointment process, particu-
larly in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and PEI
~Russell and Ziegel, 1991: 20!. Indeed, a former minister of justice in
the Mulroney government, John Crosbie, acknowledged in a media inter-
view that he had appointed Conservative activists to the bench during
his tenure as minister ~Makin, 2005!.
Screening Committee Process
Following the re-election of the Mulroney government in 1988, Justice
Minister Ray Hnatyshyn introduced a new system for appointments to
the s.96 courts and the Federal Court. The responsibilities of the Office
of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs were expanded to include
soliciting applications from those interested in a federal judicial position
and, after checking to see if they met the technical qualifications for the
post, referring those names to the advisory committees established in each
province and territory to screen the candidates. After a committee rates
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the candidates referred to it, the commissioner is responsible for report-
ing the assessments back to the minister so that appointments can be
made from the list on an ongoing basis.3
Until recent changes by the Conservative Harper government, mem-
bership on the committees consisted of one representative of the provin-
cial or territorial Law Society; one representative of the provincial or
territorial branch of the Canadian Bar Association; one representative of
the chief justice of the province or of the senior judge of the territory;
one representative of the provincial attorney general or territorial minis-
ter of justice; three representatives of the federal minister of justice ~two
of whom must be non-lawyers! and an ex officio non-voting member from
the Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs.4 In 2006,
the Harper government added a police representative to the committee ~a
fourth appointment by the federal minister of justice! and made the judi-
cial representative a non-voting chair of the committee.
Committees are asked to assess candidates based on a personal infor-
mation form filled out by candidates, contact with references provided
by the candidate and consultations with others not mentioned by the can-
didate both inside and outside the legal community. The commissioner
notes that interviews with the candidates are often not possible because
of the number of applicants that must be screened, but encourages inter-
views if there are divisions on a committee. Candidates are evaluated by
committees on their “professional competence and experience” ~such as
proficiency in the law, writing and communication skills, awareness of
racial and gender issues!; “personal characteristics” ~ethical standards,
fairness, tolerance!; and “potential impediments to appointment” ~drug
or alcohol dependency, health, financial difficulties! ~see http:00www.fja-
cmf.gc.ca0appointments-nominations0considerations-eng.html for consid-
erations which apply to an appointment!.
When the committee system was established originally, candidates
were rated as “qualified” or “not qualified,” but in 1991 this was changed
to “highly recommended,” “recommended” and “unable to recommend”
and, at that time, committees were also asked to attach a précis about the
candidate. Over the first ten years of the committee system, 1892 appli-
cations were “recommended” or “highly recommended” while 2477 appli-
cations were rated as “not qualified” or “unable to recommend” ~Millar,
2000!.5 In 2006, the Harper Conservative government revised the rank-
ing system back to a two-tiered system ~“recommend” or “unable to
recommend”!.
In the end, discretion over who gets appointed remains with the min-
ister of justice and the prime minister. According to the commissioner,
the minister can ask for a reassessment of a candidate and can make fur-
ther inquiries about a candidate with members of the judiciary or the
bar, his or her provincial counterparts, and the chief justice of the court
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to which an applicant is going to be appointed. Until 1999, provincial or
territorial judges who wanted to become federal judges were not reviewed
by committees, but thereafter nonbinding comments were provided by
the committees for such candidates ~Millar, 2000!. Finally, elevations from
the trial court level to the appellate level are not reviewed, and the prime
minister has discretion over appointments to the senior administrative posi-
tions, such as a chief justice.
Previous Assessments of the Screening Committee Process
Anecdotal evidence provided since 1988 suggests that political connec-
tions have continued to play a role in the appointments process after the
introduction of the screening system. For example, in 1998 there was a
story published about a friend of then Justice Minister Anne McLellan
being appointed in Nova Scotia after the screening committee was asked
to reassess its initial finding of “not recommended” ~Meek, 1998!. Until
now, more systematic examinations of the impact of the 1988 screening
committees on appointments were confined mostly to tracing whether
individuals had donated money to the party in power prior to their
appointment by the federal government ~Forcese and Freeman,
2005; Schmitz, 2005!. In 2008, using a more rigorous method of clas-
sifying appointees as “probable” donors than previous studies, we found
that 30.6 per cent of appointees from 1989 to 2003 very likely had
donated to their appointing party in the five years prior to their
appointment.6
In that study, we recognized various limitations of looking only at
political donations as a proxy for political connections. Relying on such
a measure potentially misses other important types of political involve-
ment ~from fundraising to running for office! that appointees may have
had. Although we believed that it was telling that the governing party
almost universally appointed individuals who had donated to them rather
than individuals who had donated to an opposition party, not having addi-
tional data limited our ability to contend with the possibility that lawyers
in general tend to be political creatures who donate to parties ~as do law
firms!. This current research provides greater insight into the back-
grounds of appointees and how the system works.
Data Collection
For our previous project we had collected the names and brief biograph-
ical details of judges appointed by the federal government between 1989
and 2003 to the s.96 courts ~trial and appeal! in the provinces, as well
as to the Federal Court ~trial and appeal! and the Tax Court. There were
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856 individuals who received such federal appointments.7 Of these judges,
303 were appointed under Prime Minister Mulroney and 553 were
appointed under Prime Minister Chrétien. ~See the appendix, table A1,
for a complete breakdown of the number of appointments made by prov-
ince and by each prime minister.!
To ascertain the political connections ~if any! of the appointees we
enlisted the help of senior lawyers and law professors in each province
to act as informants. Law professors were contacted if they had signif-
icant teaching and0or professional experience ~approximately ten years!.
Senior lawyers who had a significant profile in the legal community
were identified through various means, including electronic searches for
lawyers who held positions in professional associations, such as provin-
cial law societies and the Canadian Bar Association, lawyers who had
been designated Queen’s Counsel ~QC! and lawyers identified in media
stories.
Email requests for participation were sent to potential informants in
each province asking them to participate in a web-based survey. The web
survey asked respondents to choose an appointee from their province from
a drop-down menu. The date and court of appointment were included
beside the appointee’s name on the drop-down list.8 For each appointee,
our informants were asked first to provide an assessment of their quality
prior to their appointment. The informants were then asked whether the
appointee had some association with a political party, including minor
constituency work, fundraising, being a senior campaign activist, sitting
as a party executive or running for office. Informants were also able to
answer that they were “unsure” of an appointee’s political background or
that the appointee had “no political activity” prior to appointment. If one
or more political activities were chosen ~with a provincial party or a fed-
eral party!, the informant was asked to specify with which party the
appointee had been associated and was given the opportunity to provide
contextual commentary.
The survey then asked informants whether the appointee had any
close social connections with a federal cabinet minister, member of par-
liament, executive member of the governing party or other social connec-
tions. The same question was asked about close professional connections.
Opportunities were provided for informants to provide contextual com-
mentary about an appointee’s close social and professional connections
or any such connections with opposition parties.
In addition to providing information about appointees with whom
they were familiar, informants were encouraged to provide their general
impressions about the judicial appointment process. They were asked to
rank how important “political connections” and “social and professional
connections” were in the federal appointment process along a five-point
scale from Unimportant ~1! to Very Important ~5!. Respondents were then
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asked how the federal judicial appointments system worked in practice
and a text box was available for responses.9
The survey concluded by asking informants if they would be will-
ing to participate in a confidential telephone conversation to talk about
the appointment process in more depth. A total of 173 individuals par-
ticipated in the survey in ten provinces and we conducted 35 follow-up
interviews. The interviews began with rather open-ended questions about
the federal appointment system, which gave respondents the opportunity
to talk about what they believed were the most important features of the
system. Follow-up questions were asked about particular issues arising
from this general discussion. We then asked interviewees to provide infor-
mation about appointees with whom they were familiar but did not fill
out surveys for online because of time constraints.
As discussed below, we classified individuals using two different
classificatory schemes. First, in order to compare with Russell and Zie-
gel’s findings, we classified appointees as having “major” or “minor”
connections with the party of appointment ~and with opposition par-
ties!. Following Russell and Ziegel, an appointee had “minor” political
connections if he or she made a financial contribution to a party, under-
took minor constituency work for a party, or had social or professional
connections with party leaders. An appointee who raised funds, sat on
the executive of a party, was actively involved in an election or leader-
ship campaign, or ran for office was considered to have “major” con-
nections to a party.
Our second classification scheme was developed after we came to
believe that the Russell and Ziegel coding did not capture adequately
two important dimensions of the appointment process that we were alerted
to by comments from web survey respondents and from respondents dur-
ing interviews. One thing that the Russell and Ziegel scheme does not
allow for is the possibility that an appointee was “non-political.” As noted
below, our respondents would sometimes stress that an appointee was
non-political prior to their appointment. Our informants also made it
clear that social or professional relationships with an influential mem-
ber ~or members! of the governing party could play a very key role in
securing a judicial appointment. Based on this feedback we came to
believe that close relationships with party officials were not “minor”
connections as suggested by the Russell-Ziegel ~RZ! schema. Our find-
ings show that it is not the norm to have only high-profile connections
with party officials without significant direct involvement with a party,
but we believe that conceptually it is important to have a distinct cat-
egory for these types of major “connections” ~and more minor connec-
tions!. Therefore, we developed the following classification scheme as
described in Box 1 that we hope better highlights the importance of
networking in judicial appointments.
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Findings
General Perceptions
Table 1 presents the findings for our respondents’ general assessment of
the importance of political, social and professional connections for judi-
cial appointments to the bench. An average rating was calculated for each
province based on responses scaled from 1 to 5, with 5 suggesting that
the connection was “very important.” The table demonstrates that in many
provinces the perception exists that, despite changes to the federal selec-
tion process, politics still matters. Respondents from Prince Edward Island
rated politics particularly strongly ~4.83!, followed closely by Newfound-
land and Saskatchewan. British Columbia respondents felt political con-
nections were least important ~2.33!, suggesting in interviews that BC
was “less political” and that “people of all political stripes are getting
through federally.” However, in most other provinces respondents made
comments ~both on the survey and in interviews! suggesting that “poli-
tics plays a heavy role,” and that the process was still “highly politi-
cized.” Some felt strongly enough to state that the system was “politically
tainted,” while others suggested that the screening committees them-
selves were “highly politicized,” and that a “disturbingly large number
BOX 1
Hausegger, Hennigar and Riddell ~HHR! Scheme
No Politics The appointee had no political activity or connections with
party officials prior to appointment. @Note: This is different
than “no known affiliation”; appointees were given this clas-
sification if respondents chose “no political” rather than
“unsure” regarding an appointee’s background.#
Minor Direct Involvement The informant was a probable donor to a federal political
party or was described as engaging in minor constituency
work for a party ~federal or provincial!.
Major Connections The appointee had a close social relationship ~spouse0partner,
immediate family ties, close friendships, former roommates!
or close professional relationship ~law0business partner, cli-
ent, employee0employer! with a person who had major direct
involvement with a party ~fundraiser, campaign manager,
executive member, cabinet minister and MP or senator!.
@Note: We did not include former civil servants in this cat-
egory even though they likely had developed relationships
with government officials in the course of their work.#
Major Direct Involvement The appointee engaged in fundraising, was an executive mem-
ber, was a senior campaign organizer in elections0leadership
contests, or ran for political office ~provincial or federal!.
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of federal appointments were based far more heavily on political connec-
tions than on merit.” The ratings in Table 1 suggest that political connec-
tions play less of a role in provincial government appointments than at
the federal level.
Table 1 also suggests that social and professional connections are
important in all the provinces. Indeed, there is much less of a range of
scores for these factors. While this measure does not provide the exact
nature of this type of connection, it does suggest that the influences on
judicial appointments may be quite complex. Direct political connec-
tions may matter but so too might belonging to particular law firms or
travelling in the “right” circles. One respondent in Saskatchewan sug-
gested there were three ways to get to the bench in that province: one
could be active in the Liberal party when there is a Liberal government
in Ottawa; one could be active in the Conservative party when there is a
Conservative government in Ottawa; or one could be a member of the
MacPherson, Leslie and Tyerman ~MLT! law firm.
Specific Findings, Replicating the RZ Model
The anecdotal evidence discussed earlier in this article, and the general
perceptions of our respondents, suggest that politics still matters in fed-
eral judicial appointments, despite the introduction of screening commit-
tees in 1989. In this step of our larger project we attempted to determine
the accuracy of these perceptions by tracing actual connections between
judges and the party that appointed them. Table 2 presents the results of
that attempt using measures that mirror those used by Russell and Ziegel
in their 1991 study.
TABLE 1
Assessment of the Importance of Connections by Respondents ~mean
rating from 1 “unimportant” to 5 “very important”!
Politics
~federal!
Social and
Professional
~federal!
Politics
~provincial!
Social and
professional
~provincial!
BC 2.33 3.18 2.29 3.13
AB 4.00 4.13 3.93 3.86
SK 4.54 3.69 3.92 4.00
MB 4.47 4.00 3.79 3.92
ON 3.61 3.95 2.95 3.65
QC 4.00 3.71 3.00 3.43
NB 4.36 3.72 4.12 3.82
NS 3.94 3.80 3.80 3.71
PE 4.83 3.67 4.80 3.40
NF 4.67 4.33 2.33 3.33
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Comparing our results with the earlier study ~see table A2 in the
appendix! we find that, for all but two provinces ~PEI and Quebec!, the
percentage of judges with major connections being appointed is lower
after the introduction of the screening committees. In some provinces
the difference is quite impressive. Nova Scotia, for example, went from
41.7 per cent with major political connections to only 22.9 per cent, and
Newfoundland dropped from 33.3 per cent to 18.5 per cent. In total, we
discovered that 17.2 per cent of judges appointed from 1989 to 2003 had
major connections to the party that appointed them, a number noticeably
lower than the 24.2 per cent found by Russell and Ziegel for appoint-
ments made between 1984 and 1988. Interestingly, the appointments Prime
Minister Mulroney made in his second term, after the introduction of the
screening committees ~1989 to 1993!, demonstrate fewer major political
connections than those he made before the committees ~see table A3 in
the appendix!. These findings suggest the possibility that the screening
TABLE 2
Per Cent of Appointees Having Political Connections by Province
~Using RZ Measures!, 1989–2003
Party in
Power Involvement
No Known
Affiliation
Opposition
Involvement
Major Minor Major Minor
BC 5.0% 9.1% 76.9% 2.5% 6.6%
~n  6! ~n  11! ~n  93! ~n  3! ~n  8!
AB 20.5% 33.0% 37.5% 4.5% 4.5%
~n  18! ~n  29! ~n  33! ~n  4! ~n  4!
SK 44.7% 23.7% 28.9% 2.6% 0%
~n  17! ~n  9! ~n  11! ~n  1! ~n  0!
MB 42.9% 26.2% 26.2% 2.4% 2.4%
~n  18! ~n  11! ~n  11! ~n  1! ~n  1!
ON 9.5% 32.3% 55.4% 0.7% 2.1%
~n  27! ~n  92! ~n  158! ~n  2! ~n  6!
QC 10.8% 13.2% 75.4% 0.6% 0%
~n  18! ~n  22! ~n  126! ~n  1! ~n  0!
NB 60.0% 26.7% 10.0% 3.3% 0%
~n  18! ~n  8! ~n  3! ~n  1! ~n  0!
NS 22.9% 29.2% 47.9% 0% 0%
~n  11! ~n  14! ~n  23! ~n  0! ~n  0!
PE 90% 0% 10% 0% 0%
~n  9! ~n  0! ~n  1! ~n  0! ~n  0!
NF 18.5% 22.2% 44.4% 3.7% 11.1%
~n  5! ~n  6! ~n  12! ~n  1! ~n  3!
Totals 17.2% 23.6% 55.0% 1.6% 2.6%
~n  147! ~n  202! ~n  471! ~n  14! ~n  22!
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committees may indeed have had some impact on the process, at least at
this high level of connection.
For a few of the provinces ~see, for example, Alberta! the percent-
age of minor connections is higher than that found by Russell and Ziegel
~although our total minor connection score is very close: 23.6 per cent
versus 23.3 per cent!.10 In any case, adding major and minor connec-
tions together, Russell and Ziegel found that before the introduction of
committees, 47.5 per cent of judicial appointees ~excluding the territo-
ries! had some connection to the party that appointed them, while, using
comparable measures, we find that 40.8 per cent had connections after
the establishment of committees. Although this means that a consider-
able number of appointees continued to have connections with the party
in power, the data also reflect the observation made by a number of our
respondents who argued that the committee system has curtailed the
appointment of some hard-core partisans who lacked the background to
be recommended for appointment.
Overall, the pattern of political connections across provinces is rel-
atively similar in each time period. In both studies, some Maritime prov-
inces, Saskatchewan and Manitoba tend to have the highest level of major
political connections and the lowest level of “no known affiliation.” In
our study, PEI demonstrates the highest level of major connections fol-
lowed by New Brunswick, Saskatchewan and Manitoba, whereas in the
Russell and Ziegel study Nova Scotia was in the top four and PEI was
not. The general patterns we discover from 1989 to 2003 appear to be
relatively constant across the Mulroney and Chrétien governments as well
~see tables A3 and A4 in the appendix!.
Specific Findings using HHR Measures
Table 3 presents results using our different measures of political connec-
tion. As mentioned above we not only made a distinction between major
and minor connections, we also attempted to distinguish the type of those
connections. Therefore, we have a category for major direct political activ-
ities ~such as fundraising, running a candidate’s campaign or being a mem-
ber of the party executive!, and a category for major social or professional
connections ~such as being the spouse, roommate or law partner of a
major political player or even the minister of justice!. While appointees
falling in the first category definitely qualify as political, those falling in
the latter category are not necessarily political themselves—and yet most
observers would classify their appointment as a political one. By our mea-
sures, 22.4 per cent of appointees from 1989 to 2003 had backgrounds
that suggested major political activities, major social or professional con-
nections, or both.11 Of these, 5.3 per cent had only major social or pro-
fessional connections. However, as reported in the last column of Table 3,
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when we examined those appointees more closely we discovered that sev-
eral had some minor politics in their background ~usually donating to a
political party!. In the end, only 2.3 per cent of judges appointed between
1989 and 2003 could arguably be classified as a major political appoint-
ment without being political themselves.
The number of judicial appointees with major and minor connec-
tions varied, of course, by province. Prince Edward Island had the low-
est number of judges appointed ~10! during our time period, but 90 per
cent of those appointees had some major direct political activity in their
background, the highest percentage of any province. New Brunswick was
also very high with 76.7 per cent of its federal judicial appointments
having some kind of major activity or connection in their background.
New Brunswick differed from PEI, however, in that 16.7 per cent of its
appointees had major social or professional connections without also hav-
TABLE 3
Province by Political Affiliation ~HHR Measures! 1989–2003 ~% of
appointees within province falling in each political affiliation!
No Politics
Minor Direct
Activities
Major
Connections
and0or Major
Direct
Activities
Major
Connections
Only
Major
Connections
with Minor
Direct
Activities
BC 16.5% 9.1% 5.8% 0.8% 0.8%
~n  121! ~n  20! ~n  11! ~n  7! ~n  1! ~n  1!
AB 10.2% 28.4% 26.1% 5.7% 1.1%
~n  88! ~n  9! ~n  25! ~n  23! ~n  5! ~n  1!
SK 13.2% 21.1% 55.3% 10.5% 7.9%
~n  38! ~n  5! ~n  8! ~n  21! ~n  4! ~n  3!
MB 7.1% 19.0% 52.4% 9.5% 2.4%
~n  42! ~n  3! ~n  8! ~n  22! ~n  4! ~n  1!
ON 6.0% 29.8% 14.0% 4.6% 2.1%
~n  285! ~n  17! ~n  85! ~n  40! ~n  13! ~n  6!
QC 1.8% 12.0% 12.6% 1.8% 0.6%
~n  167! ~n  3! ~n  20! ~n  21! ~n  3! ~n  1!
NB 3.3% 23.3% 76.7% 16.7% 13.3%
~n  30! ~n  1! ~n  7! ~n  23! ~n  5! ~n  4!
NS 22.9% 20.8% 35.4% 12.5% 4.2%
~n  48! ~n  11! ~n  10! ~n  17! ~n  6! ~n  2!
PE 10.0% 0% 90.0% 0% 0%
~n  10! ~n  1! ~n  0! ~n  9! ~n  0! ~n  0!
NF 29.6% 11.1% 33.3% 14.8% 3.7%
~n  27! ~n  8! ~n  3! ~n  9! ~n  4! ~n  1!
Totals 9.1% 20.7% 22.4% 5.3% 2.3%
~n  856! ~n  78! ~n  177! ~n  192! ~n  45! ~n  20!
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ing been involved in major political activity themselves ~whereas PEI
had none!. Saskatchewan and Manitoba were the next highest provinces,
each with over half of their appointees ~55.3 per cent and 52.4 per cent
respectively! having a history of major political activity, major social or
professional connections or both. British Columbia is the province with
the lowest number of appointees falling in the major political categories.
Only 5.8 per cent of British Columbia appointees had these types of con-
nections. Although we believe Table 3 allows for a more nuanced look at
the type of connections between judges and the government appointing
them, the overall provincial patterns mirror those using the Russell and
Ziegel measures in terms of the provinces demonstrating the highest and
lowest levels of major political associations.
The provincial patterns for minor direct political activities demon-
strate some differences from those of the major ones. Ontario and Alberta
have the highest levels of appointees with minor direct political activi-
ties in their background ~perhaps reflecting the importance of political
donations to the measure! while British Columbia and PEI have the low-
est ~PEI had little room for this type of connection with nine of its ten
appointees having major political activities in their background!.
More interesting, perhaps, is the “no politics” category. The num-
bers in this category are low as we only counted a judge as having no
political background if it was definitively stated by respondents and not
contradicted by any other respondent ~we also did not put anyone in this
category who provoked only an “unsure” from respondents!. Despite our
strict definition, Newfoundland had 29.6 per cent and Nova Scotia had
22.9 per cent of their appointees fall in this category. More surprisingly,
13.2 per cent of Saskatchewan judges appointed between 1989 and 2003
fell into this category. Thus, while Saskatchewan rates as the third-
highest province in terms of major connections and political activities, it
falls as the fourth-highest province in terms of appointees with “no pol-
itics” in their background. This may reflect the smaller size of the prov-
ince ~as with Nova Scotia and Newfoundland!, which allows respondents
to be more definitive in their answers. Thus we may be capturing the
measure better in that province. Manitoba and New Brunswick present a
more expected picture, scoring high in terms of major connections and
low in terms of no politics.
Table 4 compares the findings of political affiliation for candidates
put on the bench by Prime Minister Mulroney from 1989 to 1993 to
those put on the bench by Prime Minister Chrétien from 1993 to 2003.
There are not significant differences between the two prime ministers.
However, our data suggests that Prime Minister Chrétien’s appointees
were slightly more likely to have major connections or major political
activities in their background than those of Prime Minister Mulroney
~at least in his second term!. The two prime ministers were virtually
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identical, however, in the proportion of appointees with no politics in
their background.
Table 5 takes the next step and examines the quality of appointees
chosen for the bench by the extent of their political affiliations ~as men-
tioned above, respondents were asked to rate the appointees before they
became judges!.12 Those with major direct political activities, or major
social or professional connections, in their past were rated “outstanding”
by respondents only 8.3 per cent of the time, the lowest level of any cat-
egory. This category also had a much higher number rated as only “poor”
or “fair” than the other categories. The “no politics” category is perhaps
the most instructive, however. While 32.1 per cent of these appointees
were rated as “outstanding” ~more than twice as many as any other cat-
egory!, none of these appointees was rated as “poor” or even “fair.”
TABLE 4
Appointing Prime Minister by Appointees Political Affiliation
1989–2003 ~% of PM’s appointments in each political affiliation!
No Politics
Minor Direct
Activities
Major
Connections
and0or Major
Direct
Activities
Major
Connections
Only
Major
Connections
and Minor
Direct
Activities
Mulroney 9.2% 17.5% 21.8% 5.0% 1.7%
~n  303! ~n  28! ~n  53! ~n  66! ~n  15! ~n  5!
Chrétien 9.0% 22.4% 22.8% 5.4% 2.7%
~n  553! ~n  50! ~n  124! ~n  126! ~n  30! ~n  15!
TABLE 5
Quality of Appointment by Political Affiliation HHR 1989–2003 ~% of
each political affiliation falling within each rating category!
No Politics
Minor Direct
Activities
Major
Connections
and0or Major
Direct
Activities
Major
Connections
Only
Major
Connections
and Minor
Direct
Activities
Outstanding 32.1% 15.8% 8.3% 13.3% 10.0%
Very Good 33.3% 22.6% 31.8% 24.4% 30.0%
Good 14.1% 12.4% 28.1% 28.9% 30.0%
Fair 0% 1.7% 12.0% 6.7% 10.0%
Poor 0% 0.6% 4.2% 2.2% 0%
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Discussion
Perceptions versus Reality
The perception exists in the media and among much of the legal commu-
nity that politics plays a significant, if not predominant, role in federal
judicial appointments. This perception is fueled by stories like that of a
lawyer in Saskatchewan being appointed after representing the prime
minister’s son in a criminal matter or of a lawyer in the Maritimes being
appointed as a “cushion” after her husband ~a member of the provincial
government! had an affair and their marriage ended in divorce. In nearly
every province, many respondents suggested the appointment process was
very political, involving much lobbying. A New Brunswick respondent
suggested our asking about political connections was “like asking do you
know if all Popes are Catholic.” According to this respondent “there is
generally only one criterion for s.96 judges: Does the party in power owe
you?”
However, in undertaking this project, we wondered whether stories
of obvious political patronage were reflective of the norm, or whether
they were high profile outliers, colouring peoples’ view and confusing
the issue. Our findings suggest the answer to this may depend on the
province. The respondents from PEI are probably in touch with the way
their federal judicial appointments are done, as 90 per cent of its appoin-
tees in our time period did indeed have some kind of major political con-
nection to the governing party. However, in provinces like Newfoundland,
the perception seems to be out of step with the extent of political con-
nections we actually discovered. Respondents from Newfoundland sug-
gested political connections were very important—only respondents from
PEI ranked their importance higher ~see Table 1!, and comments were
made about how politics is “dominant” in judicial appointments in the
province. However, despite these perceptions, Newfoundland placed in
the bottom half of provinces in terms of the number of its appointees
who had major political connections and, of all the provinces, Newfound-
land has the highest number of appointees with “no politics” in their back-
ground. The distortion of perception versus reality was suggested by
individual respondents in other provinces as well. For example, one
respondent suggested that no judge was appointed solely on merit in their
province, and argued that for a lawyer to become a judge they had to
“work it.” And yet, when asked about each individual appointed to the
bench from 1989 to 2003, this same respondent consistently rated a large
number of appointees as having “no politics” in their background. A thor-
ough examination of each individual judge highlights the importance of
carefully measuring the factors influencing judicial appointments and sug-
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gests that the need to be politically active in order to secure an appoint-
ment may be exaggerated in some contexts.
Obviously, however, our data suggest a reality in which differences
persist between provinces in the importance of the political backgrounds
of those appointed to the bench. Despite the introduction of committees,
New Brunswick, for example, still has a large number of appointees with
major political connections ~often through direct participation!, as does
Saskatchewan and Manitoba. The appointees in British Columbia, by con-
trast, demonstrate very few political connections—a low number that has
become even smaller since the introduction of the committees. It may be
that the small size of provinces such as New Brunswick and Saskatche-
wan offers more potential for political connections to flourish and to influ-
ence appointments.
However, depending on the province, there may be a need for even
those who are not directly active in politics to be championed ~or at
least not vetoed! by those who are connected to influential individuals
in the governing party, or by “gate keepers.” Gate keepers were identi-
fied by a number of respondents and included individuals and law firms
~such as Stewart McKelvey in the Maritimes! that seem to have signif-
icant influence in the appointment process. Respondents identified many
avenues by which this political networking and lobbying takes place,
though the importance of the regional minister was highlighted by respon-
dents across the country. A story of one appointee in Alberta detailed
that when the regional minister ~Harvey Andre! blocked an appointment
~believing the appointee was a supporter of the opposition party!, the
appointee appealed to an influential political friend. This friend had Pro-
gressive Conservative staffers go through membership lists until they
found an old membership card of the appointee. This was then sent to
the minister who promptly removed his objection, allowing the appoint-
ment to go through. We attempted to capture these kinds of connections
in our “major connections” measure. As noted in the findings section of
the article, a significant number of appointees demonstrated these major
social and professional connections in each province, and 2.3 per cent
displayed only this type of connection. Having indirect contact to regional
ministers is a significant—and we believe major—connection, and one
that needs to be considered in our models of influences on appoint-
ments. While we did encourage respondents to tell us about such net-
working activity, we recognize that it is more difficult to capture such
“behind-the-scenes” influence so we could be underestimating some-
what how influential this process is. It is worth noting that even in prov-
inces that do not display heavy major—or even minor—connections ~see
for example, Nova Scotia!, very few candidates affiliated with opposi-
tion parties are placed on the bench, which may be an indicator of the
influence that “networks” play in many provinces.
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Group Representation
For judges appointed from 1989 to 2003, another consideration appears
to have come to the forefront: group representation. Several respondents
mentioned the importance of gender, ethnicity and language to the pro-
cess, suggesting it was another “card that could be played” and one that
could even “trump politics.” The Liberal government, in particular, appears
to have actively sought out aboriginal lawyers in an effort to encourage
them to apply for judicial vacancies. And our data suggest that both the
Mulroney and Chrétien governments made conscious efforts to increase
the number of women on the federal bench ~Riddell et al., 2008!.
Reaction to group representation was mixed, with some respon-
dents suggesting they felt such appointees were of lower quality. This
statement was usually directed at female appointees who, in our time
period, tended to be appointed at a younger age than their male col-
leagues. However, when we examined the numbers for gender, female
appointees were not rated significantly lower than males. Indeed, a slightly
higher number of females were in both the “outstanding” and the “very
good” categories of our quality measure. When we examined the screen-
ing committee results for males and females we also discovered little
difference between the genders. When rated as “highly recommended”
or “recommended” versus “unable to recommend” roughly the same per-
centage of females as males achieved the highest two categories. From
2006 to 2007 ~the latest figures available! a slightly higher percentage of
women fell into the top two categories.
Interestingly, female appointees were slightly less likely to have
major direct political activities in their background, but were slightly
more likely to have major social or professional connections to the gov-
ernment appointing them.
Elevations and Promotions
Given the leadership role that appellate court judges and chief judges ~and
their associate chiefs! play in shaping the law and administering the courts,
we examined the connections of those individuals in our dataset who sub-
sequently received an administrative promotion ~to associate chief or chief
justice! or elevation to an appellate court up to July 2008. Interestingly,
we found that this subset of appointees had a higher percentage of indi-
viduals with “no politics” compared to our overall sample, but also had a
higher percentage of individuals with major direct activities or major con-
nections. For instance, 28.2 per cent of judges who were elevated and 45.2
per cent of judges who were given administrative promotions had major
direct activities or major connections, compared to 22.4 per cent in our
overall dataset. The numbers were fairly consistent between Conserva-
tive governments ~Mulroney 1988–1993 and Harper 2006–2008! and Lib-
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eral governments ~Chrétien 1993–2003 and Martin 2004–2005!. The
numbers also tended to reflect the general provincial patterns discussed
above, though one notable exception was Ontario, which featured a notice-
ably higher percentage of partisans being provided elevations and admin-
istrative appointments compared to “regular” appointments.13
Given the relatively low numbers in this subset ~78 elevations and
31 administrative promotions!, we are hesitant to read too much into the
results. Perhaps this pattern signals that for the arguably more important
appointments, which are not screened by the committees, governments
are striving to choose individuals that they think they can “trust” in these
influential positions: those without political backgrounds or those who
have had considerable experience with the party in power. The potential
that politics might influence elevations and promotions was described as
“disturbing” by Russell and Ziegel ~1991: 22!, who found that 43.3 per
cent of the elevations and promotions made by the Mulroney govern-
ment between 1984 and 1988 had major ~22.4 per cent! or minor ~20.9
per cent! connections to the Conservative government.
Implications
Although the 1990s did see some egregious appointments, and reports from
a few provinces suggested there were instances where committees were
asked to re-evaluate individuals by the political powers of the day, in gen-
eral, the vast majority of respondents agreed that the new committee sys-
tem screened out poor candidates. As one of our respondents stated, “No
matter how good your political connections, if you are a crappy lawyer
you will not get on the bench.” Several respondents suggested that the “real
political animals” were now being shut out of the process. One respon-
dent told us that a former political party leader was incredulous that, under
the committee system, a well-connected party supporter was not going to
be put on the bench. Indeed, some respondents, including several former
senior government officials, suggested that the introduction of the com-
mittee system might be most beneficial to the minister of justice who,
when faced with those lobbying him to put their campaign managers on
the bench, could simply state, “There is nothing I can do, he did not make
it through the committee.” Our replication of the Russell and Ziegel model
suggests that the appointment of judges with major political connections
is indeed down, and the difference between Prime Minister Mulroney’s first
and second terms ~before and after the introduction of the committees! is
particularly suggestive. Given that Russell and Ziegel’s data and our own
suggest that the appointments of those with strong political connections
tended to be rated lower on average than those without major connec-
tions, the introduction of the screening committees may have generated
at least incremental improvements to the quality of the s.96 and lower s.101
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bench. However, our numbers also suggest that partisanship still plays an
important role in the process, especially in some provinces, and that this
can influence both the perception of the judiciary and its actual function-
ing if the best candidates are possibly being overlooked because of polit-
ical considerations. Of course, our data only explicitly measure perceptions
of the quality of the appointment to the bench. The next step is to system-
atically measure the quality of those appointments once they are on the
bench, whether they turn out to be good judges. The patterns we have dis-
covered for federal judicial appointments will be a cause for concern if
those who are politically connected do in fact make poorer judges.14
Broader Implications and Possible Reform
The appointment process is important to those involved in the process
and to those who may come before the courts. However, it also has the
potential for larger implications on judicial independence and account-
ability. Law makers have also become increasingly concerned with the
process as the power of the courts has become more apparent in recent
decades. With cynicism growing in various corners about the role of
patronage in the current process there have been calls for change. One
possibility is something along the lines of some provincial appointment
schemes that feature nominating committees that send up a limited list
of names from which the attorney general or minister of justice is expected
to choose. This is the kind of judicial appointment system recommended
by the Canadian Bar Association ~2005! and one that Britain has recently
introduced ~Malleson, 2006!. This differs from the current federal “screen-
ing” system which only allows the committees to rate the candidates rather
than narrowing down the choices for the minister of justice. Provincial
“nominating” systems, such as the one in Ontario, theoretically should
allow for less partisan maneuvering by the appointing politician as the
choice boundaries are limited. However, the current Harper government
has opted to make changes to the federal screening committees rather
than move to a nominating committee system.15
Another possibility would be to increase the involvement of judicial
councils in judicial selection. This is favoured in some civil law coun-
tries, such as France, particularly for promotions. However, some of our
respondents warned against a system that would give judges ~or lawyers’
associations! even more influence in how future judges are chosen, given
their already considerable influence. A large number of our respondents
also argued against more direct input by legislators or voters as featured
in many selection systems in the US. Concerns were expressed that leg-
islative confirmation processes ~as happens for federal US judges! and
elections ~many US states feature direct election of judges or retention
elections following the initial appointment! politicize the judiciary and
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undermine judicial independence. Interestingly, however, a recent Cana-
dian poll found that a majority of respondents favoured the election of
judges ~Makin, 2007!.16 It is possible that this partly reflects the public’s
view that the current system lacks sufficient integrity.
Although it is unlikely that Canadians will ever elect judges, com-
parative research suggests that eliminating “politics” from the judicial
selection process may not always be possible or even viewed as desir-
able. Judicial organizations in Latin countries, for example, have been
known to develop along political lines and then vie for influence on judi-
cial councils, which play a significant role in the appointment process
~Guarnieri, 2004!. Studies of “merit based” selection systems in the US
states ~which bear some similarities to provincial nominating systems in
Canada! have found that commissioners on screening or nominating com-
mittees tend to be more politically active than the general population, that
partisanship affected the selection of both lawyer and lay commissioners,
that bar politics influenced the process and that partisan considerations
often entered into the deliberations of merit committees ~especially those
that were not required to be bipartisan! ~Reddick, 2002!. Proponents of
current US judicial selection systems argue, however, that because courts
make important public decisions, including ones that influence policy, it
is necessary to have some democratic channels for input into how judges
are selected and accountability mechanisms that are closely linked to the
people through judicial retention elections ~see Tarr, 2006: ch. 3!.17
In Ontario, the government of Premier Mike Harris showed that when
there is political concern over judicial decision-making—in this case over
perceptions that provincial judges were too lenient in sentencing in crim-
inal cases—then even a seemingly non-political nominating system of
appointments can become politicized. One study found that the Harris
government, known to request new or expanded lists of candidates from
the nominating committee, appointed a sizeable number of individuals
~nearly 30 per cent of appointees between 1998–2003! who were Con-
servative donors ~Matisz, 2005; see also Copeland, 1997!.18 Concomi-
tant with this trend in judicial appointments, members of Harris’ caucus
introduced private members bills to make the judiciary more directly
accountable to the legislature for their decisions, particularly in sentenc-
ing. Although these bills were not passed, their introduction ~and sub-
sequent lack of success! highlights how questions of judicial selection,
independence, accountability and decision-making are interrelated.
Conclusions
We argue that the discussion above illustrates the need to carefully exam-
ine any reform recommendation. Conceptions of judicial independence
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and legitimacy, and the impact of different appointment systems on them
need to be thoroughly studied. Discussions about judicial appointment
processes also need to consider how much emphasis should be placed on
diversity and what kind of diversity; whether different appointment cri-
teria and processes should be developed for different kinds of courts;
whether judges appointed under different kinds of appointment systems
decide cases differently; and how much political activity should be con-
sidered evidence of meritorious community involvement—or considered
evidence of jockeying for a judicial position. This research provides some
much needed empirical data that can begin to form a foundation for such
discussions in the context of federal judicial appointments. However, we
argue more research needs to be done before the implications of the dif-
ferent choices can be fully understood.
Notes
1 These years were chosen to provide a comparison between the 1984–1988 Mulroney
appointments and the 1989–1993 Mulroney appointments and to compare the Mul-
roney appointments with the Chrétien appointments ~1993–2003!. The time period is
long enough and has an adequate number of appointees to make a reasonable assess-
ment of the new appointment process. The dataset also provides a comparison point
for future research on whether recent changes made to the appointment process by
the Harper government result in different patterns than the ones we found.
2 There were a total of 228 appointments made to the s.96 courts, the Federal Court
~trial and appeal division!, the Tax Court and the Supreme Court. Elevations were
counted in these data as were administrative promotions to associate chief justice or
chief justice.
3 Committee assessments were valid for three years until 1999, when it was reduced to
two years.
4 In 1994, the total number of lay people appointed to the committees was expanded
from one to three. Also, in 1994, the single committee for Ontario was replaced by
three regional committees ~East and North Ontario, West and South Ontario, and
Metro Toronto! and the single Quebec committee was replaced by two committees
~one for Quebec West and one for Quebec East, which reflects the judicial district
system in Quebec!. Membership on a committee is a three-year term ~raised from
just two years in 1999! renewable for a single additional term ~see Millar, 2000:
616.!.
5 Cumulative figures supplied by the Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial
Affairs show that the pattern of having nearly 40 per cent of candidates ranked as
“recommended” or “highly recommended” has continued up to the present ~May 2006!.
6 To be counted as a probable donor, all three parts of the judge’s name had to be
represented ~first, last and middle initial! or the name had to be uncommon. To be
counted as an uncommon name, and thus a probable donor, the judge’s name could
not appear in a nationwide “find a person” search engine ~www.canada411.ca! more
than twice. This included either the judge’s complete first and last name or the judge’s
first initial and last name. Therefore if John Sproat appeared only once in the search
engine but J. Sproat was listed 18 times, the name was not considered uncommon
enough for us to be confident this donor was the judge of interest.
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7 Some individuals received more than one appointment during our time frame. For
the purposes of this study, we are primarily interested in an individual’s first appoint-
ment within the 1989 to 2003 time frame, which in some cases was an elevation
from a lower court or an administrative promotion ~to associate chief justice or chief
justice!. For example, if “Joe Smith” was appointed to the trial court in 1992 and
was then elevated to the Court of Appeal in 2001, for this project we are only inter-
ested in the 1992 appointment. It would be coded as an appointment by the Mul-
roney government to the s.96 trial court.
8 Individuals appointed to the Federal Court or Tax Court were included in the list of
appointees from the province in which they worked prior to their appointment.
9 For the sake of potential comparisons with provincial appointment systems, these
questions were repeated with reference to s.92 appointments.
10 We are reluctant to read too much into this result as we believe some of the higher
results may be attributable to our earlier study of political donations ~a component of
the minor connections measure!, which uncovered probable donations from govern-
ment records, rather than relying on reporting by respondents. Our measure should
thus capture more political donations, and flag a higher number of minor connec-
tions as a result.
11 This number comes closer to the Russell and Ziegel score for major connections
~24.2 per cent!, but includes the social and professional connections that they regarded
as only minor connections.
12 We also divided the data to examine the quality of appointees by their appointing
prime minister. The differences between Prime Ministers Mulroney and Chrétien were
not significant.
13 Some of the judges included in our sample had sat on previous courts before; thus
their first appointment in our time frame was an elevation ~from a s.92 or s.96 court!
or a promotion. We ran our model excluding those individuals whose first appoint-
ment in our dataset was an elevation or promotion to analyze the results for only
“regular” appointments. We found that including only the non-elevated or non-
promoted appointments did not change the overall results in any significant way;
hence we are able to compare those individuals who were subsequently elevated or
promoted to our overall numbers.
14 While many assume that this will, in fact, be the case when appointing politically
connected people perceived to be less qualified than other potential candidates, it is
a separate empirical question that needs to be explicitly studied. It may be that some-
one who was thought to be a very good quality appointment turns out not to have the
temperament necessary to control their courtroom, move a trial along efficiently or
be able to make a decision in a timely manner. And those who were thought to be
only fair quality when appointed may thrive once on the bench. We heard some anec-
dotal evidence from our respondents that this does happen on occasion.
15 As noted above, the Harper government returned to a ranking system of “recom-
mended” or “not recommended.” The Harper government also made the judicial
appointee a non-voting chair and added a police representative to the committee. For
an analysis of the implications of these changes, see Riddell et al. ~2009!.
16 In the 1990s, however, a two-thirds majority of respondents favoured judicial selec-
tion through a non-partisan committee. See Greene et al. ~1998: 39! reporting the results
obtained by Maureen Mancuso and her colleagues in A Question of Ethics ~1998!.
17 Tarr notes that there are many critics of US appointment systems and of having reten-
tion elections as a method of accountability. Uncompetitive elections, uninformed
electorates and the need for fund-raising are cited as potential problems with reten-
tion elections.
18 The percentage of donors to the appointing party was significantly higher than in
previous years. Matisz found that when the Liberals took power in Ontario under
Exploring the Links between Party and Appointment 655
Premier Dalton McGuinty, the number of lay people on the nominating committee
who were Liberal donors went up but that this did not translate into Liberal donors
being appointed to the provincial bench at least up until 2005, the final year for which
data was collected. A member of the Ontario Judicial Advisory Committee, Paul Cope-
land ~1997!, complained about the propensity of the Harris government to request
more names from the nominating committee. He stated that “It’s my concern that the
actions of the Attorney General in regard to rejecting the list of seven remaining
people is in effect to render the working of this committee almost meaningless.”
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Appendix
TABLE A1
Number of Appointees
Total
Mulroney
~1989–1993!
Chrétien
~1993–2003!
BC 121 50 71
AB 88 26 62
SK 38 8 30
MB 42 18 24
ON 285 107 178
QB 167 56 111
NB 30 8 22
NS 48 18 30
PE 10 3 7
NFLD 27 9 18
Totals 856 303 553
Note: If an appointee was given a subsequent appointment ~say, to chief
justice or from the s.96 court to the s.96 appeal court! only the first
appointment from 1989 to 2003 was analyzed.
TABLE A2
Mulroney Appointments 1984–1988 ~Russell and Ziegel data!*
Party in
Power Involvement
No Known
Affiliation
Opposition
Involvement
Major Minor Major Minor
BC 12.5% 17.5% 52.5% 17.5% 0%
~n  5! ~n  7! ~n  21! ~n  7! ~n  0!
AB 22.7% 13.6% 54.5% 4.5% 4.5%
~n  5! ~n  3! ~n  12! ~n  1! ~n  1!
SK 50.0% 30.0% 10.0% 0% 10.0%
~n  5! ~n  3! ~n  1! ~n  0! ~n  1!
MB 50.0% 37.5% 12.5% 0% 0%
~n  4! ~n  3! ~n  1! ~n  0! ~n  0!
ON 19.0% 25.9% 53.4% 0% 1.7%
~n  11! ~n  15! ~n  31! ~n  0! ~n  1!
QC 6.8% 29.5% 56.8% 6.8% 0%
~n  3! ~n  13! ~n  25! ~n  3! ~n  0!
NB 78.6% 0% 21.4% 0% 0%
~n  11! ~n  0! ~n  3! ~n  0! ~n  0!
~continued!
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TABLE A2 ~Continued!
Party in
Power Involvement
No Known
Affiliation
Opposition
Involvement
Major Minor Major Minor
NS 41.7% 33.3% 16.7% 8.3% 0%
~n  5! ~n  4! ~n  2! ~n  1! ~n  0!
PE 28.6% 42.9% 14.3% 0% 14.3%
~n  2! ~n  3! ~n  1! ~n  0! ~n  1!
NF 33.3% 16.7% 50.0% 0% 0%
~n  4! ~n  2! ~n  6! ~n  0! ~n  0!
Totals 24.2% 23.3% 45.4% 5.3% 1.8%
~n  55! ~n  53! ~n  103! ~n  12! ~n  4!
*Total scores differ slightly from Russell and Ziegel’s published totals as the one NWT judge has been removed
from this table ~1991, table 11!.
TABLE A3
Mulroney Appointments 1989–1993 ~RZ Model!
Party in
Power Involvement
No Known
Affiliation
Opposition
Involvement
Major Minor Major Minor
BC 4.0% 12.0% 70.0% 4.0% 10.0%
~n  50! ~n  2! ~n  6! ~n  35! ~n  2! ~n  5!
AB 23.1% 34.6% 34.6% 3.8% 3.8%
~n  26! ~n  6! ~n  9! ~n  9! ~n  1! ~n  1!
SK 62.5% 0% 37.5% 0% 0%
~n  8! ~n  5! ~n  0! ~n  3! ~n  0! ~n  0!
MB 44.4% 27.8% 16.7% 5.6% 5.6%
~n  18! ~n  8! ~n  5! ~n  3! ~n  1! ~n  1!
ON 10.3% 25.2% 59.8% 1.9% 2.8%
~n  107! ~n  11! ~n  27! ~n  64! ~n  2! ~n  3!
QC 10.7% 16.1% 71.4% 1.8% 0%
~n  56! ~n  6! ~n  9! ~n  40! ~n  1! ~n  0!
NB 50.0% 25.0% 12.5% 12.5% 0%
~n  8! ~n  4! ~n  2! ~n  1! ~n  1! ~n  0!
NS 38.9% 22.2% 38.9% 0% 0%
~n  18! ~n  7! ~n  4! ~n  7! ~n  0! ~n  0!
PE 66.7% 0% 33.3% 0% 0%
~n  3! ~n  2! ~n  0! ~n  1! ~n  0! ~n  0!
NF 0% 11.1% 66.7% 0% 22.2%
~n  9! ~n  0! ~n  1! ~n  6! ~n  0! ~n  2!
Totals 16.8% 20.8% 55.8% 2.6% 4.0%
~n  303! ~n  51! ~n  63! ~n  169! ~n  8! ~n  12!
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TABLE A4
Chrétien Appointments 1993–2003 ~RZ Model!
Party in
Power Involvement
No Known
Affiliation
Opposition
Involvement
Major Minor Major Minor
BC 5.6% 7.0% 80.3% 1.4% 5.6%
~n  71! ~n  4! ~n  5! ~n  57! ~n  1! ~n  4!
AB 19.4% 32.3% 37.1% 4.8% 6.5%
~n  62! ~n  12! ~n  20! ~n  23! ~n  3! ~n  4!
SK 40.0% 30.0% 26.7% 3.3% 0%
~n  30! ~n  12! ~n  9! ~n  8! ~n  1! ~n  0!
MB 41.7% 25.0% 29.2% 0% 4.2%
~n  24! ~n  10! ~n  6! ~n  7! ~n  0! ~n  1!
ON 9.0% 36.5% 52.2% 0% 2.2%
~n  178! ~n  16! ~n  65! ~n  93! ~n  0! ~n  4!
QC 10.8% 11.7% 77.5% 0% 0%
~n  111! ~n  12! ~n  13! ~n  86! ~n  0! ~n  0!
NB 63.6% 27.3% 9.1% 0% 0%
~n  22! ~n  14! ~n  6! ~n  2! ~n  0! ~n  0!
NS 13.3% 33.3% 53.3% 0% 0%
~n  30! ~n  4! ~n  10! ~n  16! ~n  0! ~n  0!
PE 100.0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
~n  7! ~n  7! ~n  0! ~n  0! ~n  0! ~n  0!
NF 27.8% 27.8% 33.3% 5.6% 5.6%
~n  18! ~n  5! ~n  5! ~n  6! ~n  1! ~n  1!
Totals 17.4% 25.1% 46.1% 1.1% 2.5%
~n  553! ~n  96! ~n  139! ~n  255! ~n  6! ~n  14!
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